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Abstract
Given a state-of-the-art deep neural network
text classifier, we show the existence of a uni-
versal and very small perturbation vector (in
the embedding space) that causes natural text
to be misclassified with high probability. Un-
like images on which a single fixed-size adver-
sarial perturbation can be found, text is of vari-
able length, so we define the “universality” as
“token-agnostic”, where a single perturbation
is applied to each token, resulting in different
perturbations of flexible sizes at the sequence
level. We propose an algorithm to compute
universal adversarial perturbations, and show
that the state-of-the-art deep neural networks
are highly vulnerable to them, even though
they keep the neighborhood of tokens mostly
preserved. We also show how to use these
adversarial perturbations to generate adversar-
ial text samples. The surprising existence of
universal “token-agnostic” adversarial pertur-
bations may reveal important properties of a
text classifier.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to
adversarial samples, i.e., carefully crafted samples
with imperceptible perturbations designed to mis-
lead a pre-trained model (Szegedy et al., 2013),
raising security concerns.
Two types of adversarial perturbations can
be considered: universal or sample-dependent.
Sample-dependent perturbations can vary for
different samples in a dataset, while universal
ones remain fixed for all samples. Adversarial
samples were first studied for image DNNs
with various methods proposed to generate and
defend both sample-dependent perturbations
(Szegedy et al., 2016; Carlini and Wagner, 2017;
Goodfellow et al., 2014; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016; Kurakin et al., 2016a,b; Cisse et al.,
2017) and universal perturbations
(Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017a; Mopuri et al.,
2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017b). Later,
research on attacking DNNs for text applications
emerged (Liang et al., 2017; Ebrahimi et al.,
2017; Samanta and Mehta, 2018; Jia and Liang,
2017; Li et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2018), where
the definition of an “imperceptible perturbation”
can differ from image-based perturbations.
Although most existing adversarial attack meth-
ods on textual deep learning models are sample-
dependent, recently, Behjati et al. (2019) proposed
universal adversarial attacks on text classifiers by
generating a universal sequence of words that can
be added to any input to fool a classifier with high
probability. Their method is effective, but is un-
likely to preserve the syntax or semantic of the
original input text. In this paper, we instead seek
to generate universal adversarial perturbations and
samples for text classifiers, by explicitly limiting
the norm of changes.
Our main contributions can be summarized as
follows:
• We show that a textual deep model can be
vulnerable to some small token-agnostic per-
turbation in the token embedding space.
• We propose an algorithm to compute such
universal adversarial perturbations.
• We provide a way to generate adversarial
samples in textual form, given the universal
perturbations.
2 Related Work
In general, attack methods on textual deep learn-
ing models can be categorized based on the fol-
lowing five criteria (Zhang et al., 2019): (1) model
access; (2) application; (3) target; (4) granularity
and (5) the attacked DNNs.
2.1 White-Box Attack
Considering model access, white-box attacks re-
quire access to a model’s full information.
FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014) was the first
attack on image-based models. TextFool
(Liang et al., 2017) designed three perturbation
strategies: insertion, modification, and removal to
generate adversarial samples, based on the con-
cept of FGSM. Samanta and Mehta (2018), adopt-
ing the same idea as TextFool, proposed to craft
adversarial text samples by deleting or replac-
ing the important or salient words in the text
or by introducing new words to the text sample.
Papernot et al. (2016) used the forward deriva-
tive such as JSMA (Papernot et al., 2015) to find
the sequence that contributes the most towards
the adversary direction. Grosse et al. (2016), on
the other hand, crafted adversarial samples on
input features by computing the gradient of the
model Jacobian to estimate the perturbation direc-
tion. Sun et al. (2018) adopted the C&W method
(Carlini and Wagner, 2017) for attacking predic-
tive models of medical records. Other kinds of
methods are summarized in (Zhang et al., 2019).
2.2 Universal Adversarial Perturbation
Universal adversarial perturbation was first
studied for image-based deep models by
(Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017a). They showed
the existence of universal image-agnostic pertur-
bations with remarkable generalization properties.
Later on, Poursaeed et al. (2017) proposed to
generate universal perturbations with neural
networks. Shafahi et al. (2018), on the other hand,
introduced an algorithm for universal adversar-
ial training. For natural language processing,
Behjati et al. (2019) proposed to generate uni-
versal adversarial samples by finding a universal
sequence of words that can be added to any input
to fool a classifier.
3 Proposed Methods
Given a set of samples X = {xi, i = 1, ..., N},
and a network f(w, ·) with frozen parameter w
that maps each sequence of text xi onto labels, we
define a universal adversarial perturbation δ to op-
timize the following objective:
max
δ
1
N
N∑
i=1
l(w,xi + δ) s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ ǫ (1)
Input : Training samples X, perturbation
maximum norm ǫ, learning rate λ
Output: Universal adversarial perturbation δ
Initialize δ ← 0;
for epoch = 1, ..., Nep do
for minibatch B ⊂ X do
if normalize gradients then
g = ∇δl(w, x+ δ) ;
ng = −ǫ g‖g‖p ;
δ ← δ + λng ;
else
g = ∇δl(w, x+ δ) ;
δ ← δ + λg ;
end
Project δ to lp ball ;
end
end
Algorithm 1: The proposed algorithm to gener-
ate a universal perturbation.
where l(w, ·) represents the loss used for training
DNNs. We use cross-entropy as the training loss
in this paper. ǫ denotes the maximum p-norm of δ.
Given a sequence of text sample xi =
xi,1, ..., xi,m of length m, with ei,1, ..., ei,m as the
embeddings for each token, the corresponding per-
turbed sample xi + δ is generated by adding δ to
each embedding, i.e. ei,1+δ, ..., ei,m+δ. The per-
turbation is “universal” as “token-agnostic”, i.e. it
remains the same regardless of the token to which
it is applied. We present the algorithm to generate
universal adversarial perturbations in Algorithm 1.
While our definition of adversarial perturba-
tions is similar to the one for images, the “im-
perceptibleness” is different as token embeddings,
unlike images, usually have no direct semantic
meaning for human beings. In this paper, we de-
fine “imperceptibleness” as the normalized inter-
section of the neighborhoods of a token t before
and after perturbation (N
(t)
b and N
(t)
a ), i.e.
NI(t) =
|N
(t)
b ∩N
(t)
a |
min(|N
(t)
a |, |N
(t)
b |)
(2)
and the “imperceptibleness” score for a vocabu-
lary V is then defined as,
NI(V ) =
1
|V |
∑
t∈V
NI(t) (3)
Corpus |Train| |Dev| |Test| Task Metrics Domain
MRPC 3.7k 0.4k 1.7k paraphrase acc./F1 news
CoLA 8.5k 1k 1k acceptability Matthews corr. misc.
SST-2 67k 0.8k 1.8k sentiment acc. movie reviews
QNLI 105k 5.5k 5.4k QA/NLI acc. Wikipedia
Table 1: The statistics of the datasets used for the experiments.
4 Experiment
4.1 Baseline
Although we are interested in a single universal
perturbation applicable to all tokens, we establish
a strong baseline where a unique adversarial per-
turbation is obtained for each token in a vocab-
ulary. The “universality” is then considered as
“sample-agnostic” as perturbations are now token-
sensitive, but remain unchanged for the same to-
ken in different samples. These perturbations can
be generated in a similar way as the one presented
in Algorithm 1.
We build another set of baselines by randomiz-
ing all perturbations, and then normalizing them
to the maximum p-norm limit ǫ.
4.2 Classifier and Dataset
In this paper, we focus on generating universal
adversarial perturbations for text classifiers. We
adopt BERT (Devlin et al., 2018) as the classifier
model for its promising performance on the task
of text classification. We fine tune the BERT base
model with its uncased tokenizer on four GLUE
datasets (Wang et al., 2018): MRPC, CoLA, SST-
2 and QNLI. The details of these datasets are
shown in Table 1. For each task, we explore hyper-
parameters with the following ranges, and pick the
classifier with the best performance on the evalua-
tion data.
• Batch size: 16, 32
• Learning rate: 5e-5, 3e-5 and 2e-5
• Number of epochs: 3, 4
We then split the training data of each task
into train/dev sets and train our universal adver-
sarial perturbation and samples on the train set
with hyper-parameters picked on the dev set. We
test the performance of these perturbation and
samples on the original evaluation data of each
task, which is never used for parameter-tuning or
hyper-parameter selection for those perturbation
and samples.
4.3 Result
Task Maximum p-Norm ǫ
MRPC(0.882) 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
BaselineVR 0.882 0.876 0.876 0.876
BaselineSR 0.884 0.884 0.882 0.884
BaselineV 0.863 0.858 0.831 0.820
Ours 0.860 0.811 0.770 0.748
CoLA(0.585) 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
BaselineVR 0.593 0.591 0.588 0.588
BaselineSR 0.586 0.588 0.583 0.578
BaselineV 0.580 0.575 0.557 0.346
Ours 0.580 0.566 0.278 0.168
SST-2(0.929) 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
BaselineVR 0.928 0.925 0.924 0.924
BaselineSR 0.928 0.929 0.930 0.931
BaselineV 0.925 0.876 0.750 0.608
Ours 0.892 0.823 0.704 0.585
QNLI(0.918) 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
BaselineVR 0.918 0.917 0.917 0.917
BaselineSR 0.917 0.917 0.916 0.915
BaselineV 0.916 0.917 0.915 0.908
Ours 0.916 0.897 0.844 0.499
Table 2: The comparison of the proposedmethods with
baseline approaches on the evaluation data for each
task. The performance of the classifier without ad-
versarial perturbation is presented in the parentheses.
BaselineVR: baseline with vocabulary based random
perturbations; BaselineSR: baseline with a single ran-
dom perturbation; BaselineV: baseline with vocabu-
lary based adversarial perturbations.
We use Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014) as the op-
timization algorithm and normalized gradient for
the perturbation computation. For each task, we
split the training data into train/eval sets with a
0.9/0.1 ratio, train the perturbation on the train set
and early stop on the eval set. The train batch size
is set to 32 and the eval batch size is set to 8. p is
set to 2 and the learning rate λ is set to 0.05.
We range the maximum p-norm of perturbation
ǫ from 0.05 to 0.2 and present the perturbed clas-
sifier’s performance on the evaluation data of each
Task Maximum p-Norm ǫ
MRPC 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
BaselineVR 0.907 0.830 0.762 0.697
BaselineSR 0.974 0.949 0.919 0.885
BaselineV 0.897 0.811 0.731 0.658
Ours 0.968 0.935 0.904 0.863
CoLA 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
BaselineVR 0.920 0.853 0.789 0.726
BaselineSR 0.972 0.944 0.913 0.879
BaselineV 0.906 0.815 0.740 0.690
Ours 0.963 0.931 0.905 0.863
SST-2 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
BaselineVR 0.916 0.840 0.776 0.719
BaselineSR 0.975 0.949 0.920 0.888
BaselineV 0.895 0.804 0.717 0.654
Ours 0.954 0.913 0.871 0.835
QNLI 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
BaselineVR 0.886 0.793 0.716 0.649
BaselineSR 0.975 0.950 0.922 0.891
BaselineV 0.866 0.761 0.678 0.608
Ours 0.959 0.943 0.916 0.877
Table 3: The NI(V ) score on each task. The number
of neighbors for each token is 5 and we use cosine sim-
ilarity as the distance measure between any two tokens.
task in Table 2. The choice of ǫ is determined so
that the norm of the perturbation is significantly
smaller than the average norm of token embed-
dings. For each task, we compare the proposed ap-
proach with three different baselines: BaselineVR
- vocabulary based perturbations that are randomly
initialized with p-norm scaled to ǫ; BaselineSR -
a single perturbation that is randomly initialized
with p-norm scaled to ǫ and BaselineV - vocabu-
lary based adversarial perturbations trained simi-
larly as Algorithm 1.
The results in Table 2 indicate that (1) randomly
initialized perturbations can hardly fool the clas-
sifier in spite of potentially larger p-norm than
the trained ones; (2) our proposed single universal
adversarial perturbation outperforms all the base-
lines on all the tasks.
To evaluate the “imperceptibleness” of the per-
turbation, we show the “imperceptibleness” score
defined in Equation (3) in Table 3. The number of
neighbors for each token is set to 5 and we use co-
sine as the distance measure between any two to-
kens. Single perturbation based methods are better
at preserving the neighborhood of each token than
vocabulary based ones. And our proposed method
Data Ratio
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
0.663 0.592 0.663 0.592 0.661
60% 70% 80% 90%
0.588 0.589 0.663 0.662
Table 4: The evaluation result (Accuracy) on SST-2
with the universal adversarial perturbation trained on
different ratios of training data. 10% of training data
is enough to generate perturbation with good perfor-
mance.
is comparable withBaselineSR with slightly lower
performance.
We further evaluate how much data is required
to generate the universal adversarial perturbation
and present the result in Table 4. The performance
is reported as Accuracy on the SST-2 dataset with
various ratios (from 10% to 90%) of training data
used to generate the perturbation. The maximum
p-norm is set to 0.15 and we adopt SGD as the
optimization algorithm with momentum set to 0.9
and gradients unnormalized. The result indicates
that 10% of training data is enough to generate
perturbations with comparable performance, sug-
gesting the scalability of our method on large-
scale real-world corpora.
4.4 Adversarial Samples
We generate adversarial samples in textual form
by (1) for each token in the vocabulary, find its
closest neighbor after perturbation; (2) for each in-
put sample, replace the token with its found neigh-
bor such that the distance (cosine) between the two
is the largest among all tokens and their corre-
sponding neighbors in the input sample. We list
Text (top: original, bottom: adversarial) Prediction
the bears sniffed 1
a bears sniffed 0
i walk and dana runs . 1
i walk , dana runs . 0
sue gave to bill a book . 1
sue gave to bill the book . 0
terry delighted . 0
terry delighted ; 1
dana walking and leslie running . 0
dana walking , leslie running . 1
Table 5: A few adversarial samples generated on CoLA
evaluation data. ǫ is set to 0.2.
some examples on CoLA in Table 5. One may ar-
gue that the low evaluation score on CoLA is be
expected as the generated adversarial samples are
unlikely to be linguistically acceptable. However,
these results suggest that the classifier may be con-
fused easily.
5 Future Work
In the future, we plan to look into theoretical ex-
planations for the existence of token-agnostic uni-
versal adversarial perturbations. We also seek to
find a better way to utilize these universal pertur-
bations, e.g., adversary training.
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